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Anelia Dikovytska

Comment – Final Draft

REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS: CAN JUDICIARY PROVIDE ADEQUATE SOLUTION?
I. INTRODUCTION
The current system for the provision of pharmaceuticals is highly inefficient.1 The world
spends $1 trillion on medicines.2 In the United States, the total healthcare system spending on
pharmaceuticals has reached $320 billion in 2011.3 Millions of people face suffering or death
because they cannot afford the patented drugs sold at 20 to 50 times their cost of production.4
Prices of medicines directly affect their accessibility, even in the countries with universal
insurance system like the United Kingdom.5
The US government created an incentive for the pharmaceutical innovators by awarding
them with patent rights which grant an “exclusive rights to use the patented product, enabling
high mark-ups through which innovators can profit if demand for the product is large enough
even at high prices.”6 A patent gives to its owner a legal right to exclude others, for limited time
periods, from making, using, or selling the patented product without the patent owner’s
permission, and the state sanctions the violators of the patent rights.7 The proponents of strong
patent protection for pharmaceutical companies note the importance of providing an incentive for

1

Danielle Celermajer & Thomas Pogge, A Cure for All Ills of the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme, THE SYDNEY
MORNING HERALD (March 7, 2012), http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/society-and-culture/a-cure-for-all-ills-of-thepharmaceutical-benefits-scheme-20120306-1ui91.html.
2
Aidan Hollis & Thomas Pogge, Vision & Origin of the Health Impact Fund, HEALTH IMPACT FUND (last visited
Jan. 19, 2013), http://healthimpactfund.com/origin.
3
The Use of Medicines in the United States: Review of 2011, IMS INSTITUTE FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS (Apr.
2012),
http://www.imshealth.com/ims/Global/Content/Insights/IMS%20Institute%20for%20Healthcare%20Informatics/IHI
I_Medicines_in_U.S_Report_2011.pdf.
4
Celermajer, supra note 1.
5
Amitava Banerjee, Aidan Hollis & Thomas Pogge, The Health Impact Fund: Incentives for Improving Access to
Medicines, 375 THE LANCET 166 (Jan. 9, 2010), http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS01406736(09)61296-4/fulltext?_eventId=login.
6
Id.
7
35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2006).
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innovation.8 According to this standpoint, 9 the social good resulting from the development of
new medicines outweighs the anti-competitive effects of patents which protect the patentees’
prices from competition.10 The patent owners further justify high prices for their drugs by
emphasizing the immense financial burdens of pharmaceutical research and development.11 The
cost incurred by the pharmaceutical companies is at least in the hundreds of millions of dollars
for each successful product.12 Hence, the pharmaceutical companies should be entitled to
financial returns promoted by a system with strong patent protection.13
In 1984, Congress enacted the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration
Act,14 commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act (“the Act”), to encourage the generic drug
manufacturers to challenge weak patents of the brand name drug companies, thereby ensuring
that lower cost generic versions of the drug are available to public.15 If such challenges are
successful, they result in substantial cost cutting for both the consumers and the health care
system by allowing the generic drugs to enter the market long before the expiration of the brand
name manufacturers’ patents.16 The pharmaceutical and generic drug companies, however, have
found a way to circumvent the provisions of the Act. By settling the patent challenge lawsuits,
the companies still benefit from the Hatch-Waxman Act provisions but effectively undermine the
Act’s goals of lowering the drug prices and making pharmaceuticals more accessible to the

8

William W. Fisher & Talha Syed, Global Justice in Healthcare: Developing Drugs for the Developing World, 40
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 581, 667 (2007).
9
See Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Research-Based Pharmaceutical Companies: The Need for Improved Patent Protection
Worldwide, 2 J. L. & TECH. 307, 307 (1987) (“Only effective patent protection provides the incentives necessary to
enable pharmaceutical companies to commit the required resources.”).
10 Fisher, supra note 8 at 667-68.
11
Banerjee, supra note 5.
12
Id.
13
Fisher, supra note 8 at 668.
14
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984).
15
See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006).
16
Eugene R. Quinn, FTC Seeks SCOTUS Review in AndroGel “Pay-for-Delay” Case, IPWATCHDOG (Oct 4, 2012,
6:06 PM), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2012/10/04/ftc-seeks-scotus-review-androgel/id=28563.
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public. These settlements, where brand name pharmaceutical companies pay generic drug
producers to delay entering the market, are known as “reverse payment settlements,” “reverse
settlements,” or pay-for-delay” agreements17 because a patent holder makes the payment to a
patent challenger. Studies by the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) have found that reverse
settlements result in the annual cost of $3.5 billion to consumers from the loss of competition
caused by the delay of generic drug entry into the market.18 The issue of whether a reverse
payment settlement is the act of unlawful monopoly or merely a settlement favorable to both
companies became a subject of a sharp dispute in all three branches of government and created a
split among the circuits.19 Some proposed solutions to the controversy take a patent law posture,
others an antitrust approach, and neither the judiciary nor the legislature appears to be willing to
embrace a more effective middle-ground approach proposed by scholars.20 This Comment
delineates a global solution based on the use of financial regulation and the creation of a new
payment system to control the prices of brand name pharmaceutical. This proposal would not
only address the damaging results of reverse payment settlements but significantly improve
access to pharmaceutical worldwide.
Part II of this Comment provides an overview of the Hatch-Waxman framework. Part III
explains the harmful effects of reverse payment settlements on the consumers and reasons why
these settlements, unlike other settlements, should not be favored over litigation under the public
policy. Part IV addresses in detail the circuit split regarding the appropriate standard to evaluate
17

See, e.g., David W. Opderbeck, Rational Antitrust Policy and Reverse Payment Setlements in Hatch-Waxman
Patent Litigation, 98 GEO. L.J. 1305, 1315 (2010); see also Scott A. Backus, Reversing Course on Reverse Payment
Settlements in the Pharmaceutical Industry: Has Schering-Plough Created the Blueprint for Defensible Antitrust
Violations?, 60 Okla. L. Rev. 375 (2007) (the agreements are sometimes referred to as “pay for delay, exit, or
exclusion payment settlements”).
18
FTC, Pay-for-Delay: How Drug Company Pay-Offs Cost Consumers Billions 2 (2010), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/01/100112payfordelayrpt.pdf.
19
Hayden W. Gregory, Sorting Things Out: Patents, Antitrust Law, and Settlement of Hatch-Waxman Act
Infringement Suits, LANDSLIDE, Sept.-Oct. 2012, at 3.
20
Id.
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the legality of the reverse settlements. Part V describes the proposed legislative solutions, none
of which were ultimately adopted by Congress. Part VI addresses various approaches to the pay
for delay controversy proposed by renowned scholars and pertinent administrative agencies. Part
VII evaluates the most effective judicial solution while taking into account the applicable public
policy considerations. Finally, Part VIII explains why even the most effective judicial solution
would only resolve a small fraction of the overall problem of drug accessibility and provides an
overview of the new fair, cost-effective ways to pay for pharmaceutical innovation outside of the
patent system, which could work globally or nationally to address the crucial problem of drug
accessibility worldwide and in the United States.
II. THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT FRAMEWORK IN PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT LITIGATION
The Hatch-Waxman Act encourages generic manufacturers to compete with name brand
companies and to attempt to enter the market by filing a paragraph IV certification.21 The
pharmaceutical company which seeks to begin marketing a new prescription drug must obtain an
approval from the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”).22 This requires the company to
submit a New Drug Application (“NDA”) listing extensive information about the drug, including
any patents pertaining to the drug’s components and indications. 23 The Hatch-Waxman Act
allows a potential generic drug manufacturer to submit an abbreviated application for approval
with the FDA, also known as an Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”).24 In filing an
ANDA, the generic manufacturer can rely on the FDA’s prior ruling approving the NDA filed by
the brand name company.25 The generic manufacturer who files an ANDA must also recognize

21

21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV).
21 U.S.C. § 355(a).
23
21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1).
24
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (the Hatch-Waxman Act amended the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C.
§§ 301-399).
25
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A).
22
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any patents covering the brand name drug and certify that, “in the opinion of the applicant and to
the best of his knowledge,” the patent is either invalid or it is not infringed by the proposed
generic drug (known as “paragraph IV certification”).26 The ANDA applicant must also notify,
in writing, every patentee affected by the ANDA that the applicant has filed a paragraph IV
certification.27 The patentee will have 45 days after the generic manufacturer submits its
paragraph IV certification to file a patent infringement lawsuit.28 Filing of the suit will trigger an
automatic stay – the FDA will postpone its approval of the generic drug until either 30 months
pass, or a district court determines that the patent is either invalid or not infringed, whichever is
earlier.29
The Hatch-Waxman Act provides an incentive to the generic manufacturers in form of
the 180-day exclusivity period to encourage generic production and challenge brand name
patents.30 Following FDA approval of the ANDA, the first generic manufacturer who files a
paragraph IV certification is entitled to a 180-day exclusivity period during which the generic
manufacturer has an exclusive right to commercially market its drug.31 The exclusivity period
begins to run when the first ANDA applicant puts its drug on the market, and the subsequent
ANDA applications by other generic drug companies will not be approved by the FDA during
this period.32 This allows the successful challengers of brand name drug patents to sell their

26

21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(III)-(IV); for a more detailed explanation see Angela Foster and Ebony J. Foster,
Reverse Payment Settlements: ‘Legal, Illegal or Unlawful’, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & LIFE SCIENCES, 209 N.J.L.J.
916, at S-4 (Sept. 17, 2012).
27
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B)(iii)(I); see also Gregory, supra note 19, at 3 (“By statute, a paragraph IV certification is
an act of infringement.”).
28
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
29
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(I).
30
Eugene R. Quinn, Pharma Reverse Patent Payments Are Not An Antitrust Violation, IPWATCHDOG (Apr. 29,
2010, 4:41 PM), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2010/04/29/reverse-payments-not-antitrust-violation/id=10339.
31
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).
32
Id.
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generic versions of the drugs at extremely competitive prices.33
It is important to note that only the first filer of the ANDA with a paragraph IV
certification is entitled to the 180-day period of market exclusivity:34 “even if the first filer never
becomes eligible to use its 180-day exclusivity period because it settles, loses, or withdraws the
litigation, that potential benefit will not pass to subsequent filers.”35 The first applicant is
typically the most determined to challenge the patent of the brand name company.36 Ideally, at
the culmination of the 180-day window, all generic drug manufacturers would be able to enter
the market quickly after the first filer’s successful challenge of the patent. 37 As a result, the
consumers would have access to low-cost generic drugs in accordance with the goals of the
Hatch-Waxman Act.38 This part of the framework is what allows the companies to easily
undermine the objectives of the Act.39 A brand name patentee can simply settle the patent
challenge lawsuit by paying off the first ANDA filer. 40 Any subsequent generic manufacturers
can file a paragraph IV certification, but because they are not entitled to the 180-day exclusivity
period, they lose the incentive to challenge the patent.41 As a result, the brand name company
who owns even the weakest patent successfully avoids any generic competition until the end of

33

Quinn, supra note 30.
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(iii).
35
In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 204 (3d Cir. 2012), petition for cert. filed, 81 U.S.L.W. 3090 (Aug. 24,
2012) (No. 12-245), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docket files/12-245.htm;
petition for cert. filed, (Aug. 29, 2012) (No. 12-265), available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/12-265.htm (citing 21 U.S.C. §
355(j)(5)(D)(iii))).
36
See C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1583 (2006) (indicating that there is “a sharp difference in incentives . . . between [the]
ANDA-IV filer and all other generic firms”).
37
Quinn, supra note 30.
38
H.R. Rep. No. 98-857(I), at 14-15, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2647-48.
39
David A. Balto, Pharmaceutical Patent Settlements: The Antitrust Risks, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 321, 331 (2000)
(“The competitive concern is that the 180-day exclusivity provision can be used strategically by a patent holder to
prolong its market power in ways that go beyond the intent of the patent laws and the Hatch-Waxman Act by
delaying generic entry for a substantial period.”).
40
K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 204; see also Quinn, supra note 30.
41
Id.
34
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the patent term.42
Aware of the possibility of antitrust violations resulting from reverse settlements,43
Congress amended the Hatch-Waxman Act in 2003 to require pharmaceutical companies who
settled patent challenge lawsuits to file their settlement agreements with the FTC and the
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) for antitrust examination.44 While the FTC has vigorously
opposed reverse payment settlements, the federal circuits have disagreed as to the lawfulness of
the reverse payment settlements, creating a split.45
III. THE HARMFUL EFFECTS OF THE REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS
According to a 2010 study conducted by the FTC, “[p]ay-for-delay agreements are
estimated to cost American consumers $3.5 billion per year – $35 billion over the next 10 years”
due to the unavailability of lower-cost generic drugs.46 About a year after the first generic
version of a drug enters the market, this generic version, on average, replaces over 90% of the
brand name company’s unit sales. 47 In addition, the price of the generic version is
approximately 85% lower than the price of the brand name pharmaceutical prior to the market

42

Quinn, supra note 30; see also 180-Day Generic Drug Exclusivity for Abbreviated New Drug Applications, 64
Fed. Reg. 42,873, 42,882-83 (Aug. 6, 1999) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 314) (“It can be mutually beneficial for the
innovator and the generic company that is awarded 180 days of generic exclusivity to enter into agreements that
block generic competition for extended periods. This delayed competition harms consumers by slowing the
introduction of lower priced products into the market and thwarts the intent of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments.”).
43
See S. Rep. No. 107-167, at 4 (2002).
44
K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 204 (citing Pub. L. No. 108-173, §§ 1111-1118, 117 Stat. 2066, 2461-64 (codified as amended
at 21 U.S.C. § 355(j))).
45
Anticompetitive Pay-for-Delay Settlements in the Pharmaceutical Industry: Why Consumers and the Federal
Government Are Paying Too Much for Prescription Drugs: Hearing on H.R. 1706 Before the Subcomm. on Courts
and Competition Policy of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 1 (2009) (prepared statement of Richard A.
Feinstein, Director, Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade Commission), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/06/P859910payfordelay.pdf.
46
FTC, Pay for Delay: How Drug Company Pay Offs Cost Consumers Billions 2 (2010), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/01/100112payfordelayrpt.pdf (citing Jon Leibowitz, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n,
“Pay-for-Delay” Settlements in the Pharmaceutical Industry: How Congress Can Stop Anticompetitive Conduct,
Protect Consumers’ Wallets, and Help Pay for Health Care Reform (The $35 Billion Solution) at 8 (June 23, 2009),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leibowitz/090623payfordelayspeech.pdf)).
47
FTC, supra note 46.
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entry of the generic drug.48 Because of the sharp difference between the generic and the brand
name drug prices, the entry of the generic drug on the market amounts to a significant benefit to
the consumers but results in a loss of revenue to the brand name producers.49 To avoid this
revenue loss, makers of brand name pharmaceuticals offer to settle the litigation challenging
their drug patent.
Generally, public policy favors settlements over expensive and lengthy litigation process.
In the Hatch-Waxman context, however, the FTC posits that courts should presume that reverse
settlements are unlawful because they violate antitrust laws and unnecessarily increase
consumers’ health care costs by billions of dollars.50 Similarly, the DOJ has opined that reverse
settlements should be presumed unlawful, noting that such presumption would be rebuttable with
a showing that a settlement “provide[s] a degree of competition reasonably consistent with the
parties’ contemporaneous evaluations of their prospects of litigation success.”51 Eugene Quinn,
the intellectual property scholar, indicates that the Hatch-Waxman Act aimed to balance “two
competing policy interests: (1) inducing pioneering research and development of new drugs; and
(2) enabling competitors to bring low-cost, generic copies of those drugs to market.”52 What
resulted, however, was “a full employment act for lawyers, and underground funding of generic
drug manufacturers who have an incentive to challenge patented drugs.”53 The courts are faced
with a challenge of formulating framework which would incorporate public policy favoring

48

FTC, supra note 46.
K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 208; FTC, supra note 46.
50
FTC, supra note 46; Opderbeck, supra note 17 at 1317 n.123 (citing Appeal Brief of Counsel Supporting the
Complaint, In re Schering-Plough Corp., No. 9297 (Fed. Trade Comm’n Aug. 9, 2002), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/08/scheringtrialbrief.pdf)).
51
Opderbeck, supra note 17 at 1318 n.131 (citing Brief for the United States in Response to the Court’s Invitation at
10, Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund, No. 05-2851-cv(L), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f247700/247708.pdf)).
52
Eugene R. Quinn, Senate Bill Would Prevent Reverse Pharma Payments, IPWATCHDOG (Feb. 6, 2009, 4:47 PM),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2009/02/06/senate-bill-would-prevent-reverse-pharma-payments/id=1950.
53
Id.
49
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settlements over litigation yet simultaneously address the harmful effects of reverse payment
settlements in the Hatch-Waxman Act context.
IV. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER THE APPROACH TO THE PAY FOR DELAY ISSUE
The circuit courts disagree over the legality of reverse payment settlements and the
appropriate standard of law to apply. Under the Sherman Act, “[e]very contract, combination in
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.”54 The Supreme Court has continuously
disallowed only those restraints on trade that are unreasonable.55 In analyzing the reverse
settlements, the circuit court opinions have shared a focus on the exclusionary power of the
patent, but split concerning ways to balance the patentees’ rights against the policy interest in
encouraging generic drug competition.56 The Supreme Court of the United States has granted
the government’s petition for a writ of certiorari on December 7, 2012 to review the highly
contested issue of the lawfulness of reverse settlements.57 Below is an overview of the three
predominant legal theories concerning the validity of reverse settlements: the per se approach,
the scope of the patent rule, and the rule of reason.
A. One Approach: Reverse Payment Settlements are Per Say Illegal
Some courts have found that because certain agreements are always unreasonable, and
their anti-competitive implications clearly outweigh any potential pro-competitive benefits, these
types of settlements are unlawful per se.58 This hard-line approach applies where a “practice

54

15 U.S.C. § 1.
See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997).
56
Opderbeck, supra note 17 at 1316.
57
FTC v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 81 U.S.L.W. 3324 (U.S. Dec. 7,
2012) (No. 12-416), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/120712zr_3f14.pdf.
58
In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 204 (3d Cir. 2012), petition for cert. filed, 81 U.S.L.W. 3090 (Aug. 24,
2012) (No. 12-245), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docket files/12-245.htm;
petition for cert. filed, (Aug. 29, 2012) (No. 12-265), available at
55
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facially appears to be one that would always or almost always tend to restrict competition or
decrease output.”59 For example, courts have held horizontal price fixing, output limitations,
market allocation, and group boycotts to be per se illegal.60
The Sixth Circuit’s decision of In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation exemplifies the
application of per se analysis.61 In Cardizem, the generic manufacturer Andrx agreed not to
market its version of the patented blood-pressure drug Cardizem CD of Hoescht Marion Roussel,
Inc. (“HMR”) until it obtained a conclusive decision that the generic version did not infringe
patent held by HMR.62 The purchasers of Cardizem CD brought a lawsuit, alleging that the
generic company’s agreement to delay market entry caused them to suffer antitrust harm.63 The
court was concerned with the terms of the settlement which prevented the marketing of generic
versions of not only the brand name patented drug, but also drugs “not at issue in the pending
litigation.”64 The Sixth Circuit reasoned that the brand name manufacturer paid “the only
potential competitor $40 million per year to stay out of the market.”65 The court distinguished
between merely taking advantage of a monopoly “that naturally arises from a patent” and
“altogether . . . bolster[ing] the patent’s effectiveness in inhibiting competitors by paying [off the
only competitor].”66 The court concluded that the settlement was “a horizontal agreement to
eliminate competition in the market for Cardizem CD throughout the entire United States, a

http://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/12-265.htm (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(iii)))
(quoting State Oil Co., 522 U.S. at 10)).
59
K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 209 (citing Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979)).
60
See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984); N. Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356
U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
61
In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 939 (2004).
62
Id. at 902.
63
Id. at 904.
64
Id. at 908 n.13.
65
Id. at 908.
66
Id.
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classic example of a per se illegal restraint of trade.”67
A few years before Cardizem, the D.C. Circuit decided a Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail
Corp. Int’l.68 In Andrx, rather than resolving the patent challenge lawsuit by settlement,69 the
name brand pharmaceutical company offered a payment to the generic manufacturer if it agreed
to delay marketing the generic version of the drug, while allowing the patent challenge lawsuit to
continue.70 The payments were to begin on the date FDA approved the generic version of the
drug and end when either the generic producer began selling its version of the drug or the
abovementioned patent challenge lawsuit was resolved in favor of the patent holder.71 After
obtaining the FDA approval, the brand name manufacturer began making payments of $10
million per quarter to the generic manufacturer,72 and the generic manufacturer avoided
triggering the 180-day exclusivity window by refraining from entering its version of the drug on
the market.73 The court held that the agreement at issue violated Sherman Act, explaining that
the agreement was “so broad that part of the restraint suppresse[d] competition without creating
efficiency. 74 Despite these successful challenges of pay-for-delay deals against the patentee’s,
other courts approached the issue differently, resulting in a deep split of authority.75
B. Another Approach: the Scope of the Patent Analysis
Some courts declined to apply the per se rule and allowed reverse payment agreements

67

In re Cardizem, 332 F.3d at 908. The Court also found the instant agreement resulted in the delay of the entry of
other competitors into the market because Andrx had refused to utilize its exclusivity window. Id. at 907.
68
Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int’l, 256 F.3d 799 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 931 (2002).
69
Gregory Dolin, Reverse Settlements as Patent Invalidity Signals, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 281, 295 (The settlement
at issue was the same settlement described above in In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir.
2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 939 (2004)).
70
See Andrx, 256 F.3d at 803.
71
Id.
72
Id. at 809.
73
Id. at 804.
74
Id. at 815.
75
Laura J. Grebe, Comment: Generic Entry in a Rough Economy--Proposed Legislation May Ease Health Care
Costs, 14 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 167, 179 (2010).
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on the grounds that they are valid settlements in patent infringement actions.76 Under the “scope
of the patent” test implemented by these courts, the reverse settlement will not be invalidated if
the exclusion does not exceed the scope of the patent, the patent owner’s infringement lawsuit
was not objectively baseless, and the patent was not obtained fraudulently.77
The Eleventh Circuit considered the issue of pay for delay deals in Valley Drug Co. v.
Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc.78 In Valley Drug, a name brand pharmaceutical company sued a
generic producer for infringement of its patent, and the generic producer claimed the patent was
invalid.79 The parties settled the lawsuit by entering into two agreements, one of which was a
final settlement of specific claims, and the other was structured in a similar way to the
agreements in Andrx and Cardizem and became effective while the litigation continued.80 The
agreements stated that the brand name company would provide large payments to the generic
producer to delay the market entry of the generic drug until the brand manufacturer’s patent
expires.81 The district court held that the settlements involved were per se illegal and violated
Sherman Act.82 The Eleventh Circuit reversed, reasoning that the name brand company’s patent
gives it the right to exclude competitors.83 According to the test set forth by the Eleventh
Circuit, the court must consider “the scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent, the extent
to which [the] provisions of the agreements exceed that scope, and the anticompetitive effects

76

Id.
Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1066 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 919 (2006) (citing
Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294,1312 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 939 (2004));
see also Foster, supra note 26 at S-5.
78
Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1294.
79
Id. at 1299.
80
Id. at 1300.
81
Id. Subsequently, the court determined in another case that the brand name company’s patent was invalid. Id. at
1306-7.
82
Id. at 1301, 1306.
83
Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1306.
77
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thereof.”84 If any part of the settlement agreement reached beyond the protections provided by
the brand name company’s patent, the court would apply traditional antitrust scrutiny to those
parts of the settlement.85
The Eleventh Circuit applied the Valley Drug framework in Schering-Plough Corp. v.
FTC.86 Schering-Plough (“Schering”), a large pharmaceutical company, manufactured numerous
drugs, including K-Dur 20, a potassium chloride supplement.87 Schering-Plough owned a patent
on the extended-release coating used in K-Dur 20, which was scheduled to expire in 2006.88
Upsher-Smith (“Upsher”), a competing drug company, filed an ANDA for a generic version of
K-Dur 20.89 In response, Schering sued for an infringement of their coating patent.90 Before the
trial began, the parties signed a settlement whereby Schering agreed to pay royalty fees as well
as 10-15% royalty payments for five of Upsher’s other drugs.91
Meanwhile, a second competing generic manufacturer, ESI Lederle, Inc. (“ESI”), filed an
application with the FDA to market its own generic version of K-Dur 20,92 including a paragraph
IV certification challenging Schering’s extended release coating.93 Consequently, Schering
settled with ESI as well, agreeing to pay ESI up to $15 million for ESI postponing market entry
of its generic K-Dur 20 version.94 The FTC challenged both settlements as antitrust law
violations, but an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) upheld the agreements.95 On appeal, the

84

Id. at 1311-12.
Id. The court remanded the case to determine whether the agreement was a “reasonable implementation” of the
“protection afforded by the patents.” Id. at 1312.
86
Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1066 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 919 (2006).
87
Id. at 1058.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id. at 1059.
91
Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1059-60.
92
Id. at 1060.
93
Id. at 1060 n.5.
94
Id. at 1061.
95
Id. 1061. Because the FTC is an administrative agency, the hearing took place before the ALJ.
85
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Eleventh Circuit agreed with the ALJ and rejected the per se rule.96 Instead, the court applied
the antitrust test articulated in Valley Drug.97 The court explained that, taking into account the
presumption of patent validity, the scope of Schering’s patent allowed the company to exclude
patent infringers, but the company could not exclude beyond that.98 The court decided that both
agreements did not exceed the scope of the patent at issue and the payment from Schering to
Upsher was not a reverse settlement but a payment for drug licenses.99 In contrast, the
agreement with ESI did involve a reverse payment.100 Nevertheless, the court focused on the
judicial policy favoring settlements101 and held that the agreements in question were valid.102
The more recent case to adopt this approach is FTC v. Watson Pharmaceuticals,103 where
the Eleventh Circuit clarified that its version of the “scope of the patent” analysis conformed to
the analysis adopted by the Second and Federal Circuits.104 The court upheld a settlement
concerning a testosterone drug, indicating that “[a] patent holder and any of its challengers
cannot enter into an agreement that excludes more competition than the patent has the potential
to exclude.”105 The court explained that the phrase “strengths of the patent” used in Schering-

96

Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1065.
Id. at 1065-1066.
98
Id. at 1068.
99
Id. at 1071. The court decided that in the Upsher agreement, the royalty payments were for royalties on the drug
licenses for five drugs other than K-Dur 20, and there was no evidence that these payments were excessive. Id.
100
Id. at 1072.
101
Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1072 (citing Standard Oil Co. v. U.S., 283 U.S. 163 (1931)).
102
Id. at 1076.
103
FTC v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 81 U.S.L.W. 3324 (U.S. Dec. 7,
2012) (No. 12-416).
104
Michael A. Carrier, Article: Why The “Scope Of The Patent” Test Cannot Solve The Drug Patent Settlement
Problem, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1. (2012). The Eleventh Circuit explained that “its prior opinions did not call
for an evaluation of the strength of the patent but rather only a determination whether, absent sham litigation or
fraud in obtaining the patent, the settlement agreement exceeded the scope of the patent.” In re K-Dur Antitrust
Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 204 (3d Cir. 2012), petition for cert. filed, 81 U.S.L.W. 3090 (Aug. 24, 2012) (No. 12-245),
available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docket files/12-245.htm; petition for cert. filed,
(Aug. 29, 2012) (No. 12-265), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/12265.htm (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(iii))) (citing Watson, 677 F.3d at 1311-13 n.8, 1313-14).
105
Watson, 677 F.3d at 1308.
97
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Plough Corp. v. FTC106 referred to “the potential exclusionary scope of the patent,” meaning
“the exclusionary rights appearing on the patent’s face and not the underlying merits of the
infringement claim.”107
The Second Circuit considered the pay for delay issue in In re Tamoxifen Citrate
Antitrust Litigation.108 At issue in this case was a patent for Tamoxifen, a widely used breast
cancer drug.109 Imperial Chemical Industries, PLC (“ICI”), the holder of the drug patent,
marketed the drug through Zeneca, ICI’s subsidiary, under the brand name Nolvadex(R).110
Barr, another pharmaceutical company, filed an ANDA with a paragraph IV certification,
seeking approval of its generic version of Tamoxifen, and ICI responded with filing an
infringement suit.111 After the district court held that the patent was invalid, the ICI appealed the
infringement suit decision, but the parties settled while the case was on appeal.112 Pursuant to
their agreement, ICI granted Barr a license to sell an unbranded version of Tamoxifen under
Barr’s label and agreed to pay Barr $21 million as well cover the costs of material supplies for
Barr of $35.9 million over a ten year period.113 In exchange, Bar agreed to refrain from pursuing
its paragraph IV certification and manufacturing its own generic version of Tamoxifen until
ICI’s patent expired.114 The settlement ended the lawsuit between the parties instantly,115 unlike
some of the cases mentioned above where the brand name company would be making the
payments pending the resolution of the infringement action.

Schering, 402 F.3d at 1056 (Eleventh Circuit’s version of the scope of the patent test seemed to focus on the
patent's “exclusionary potential” and “likelihood” of obtaining an injunction).
107
Watson, 677 F.3d at 1311 n.8.
108
In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation, 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 551 U.S. 1144 (2007).
109
Id. at 190.
110
Id. at 193.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 194.
114
Id. at 193-194 (the parties obtained a vacatur of the district court’s decision invalidating the patent).
115
Id. at 215.
106
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Subsequently, Barr’s use of its 180-day exclusivity period prevented other paragraph IV
challengers from obtaining approval for their versions of Tamoxifen.116 While these companies
again disputed the validity of ICI’s patent in court, consumer organizations filed an action
challenging the lawfulness of the ICI-Barr settlement.117 The district court dismissed the
antitrust plaintiffs’ claims, reasoning that, even though the horizontal agreements like the one at
issue typically violate the Sherman Act, they may still be lawful when the party preventing
competition is the patentee.118 The Second Circuit agreed,119 rejecting the idea that reverse
settlements are per se violations of antitrust law.120 The court explained that as long as “the
patent litigation is neither a sham nor otherwise baseless” or beyond the scope of the patent, the
patentee can enter into an agreement “to protect that to which it is presumably entitled: a lawful
monopoly over the manufacture and distribution of the patented product.”121 The court held that
“there is no injury to the market cognizable under existing antitrust law, as long as competition is
restrained only within the scope of the patent.”122 The only two exceptions to this “scope of the
patent” analysis occur where the patent was obtained by fraud or where the patent enforcement
action was objectively baseless.123 The brand name company’s patent in this case would have
effectively precluded all generic versions of Tamoxifen as any such generic drug would infringe
the patent.124 The Second Circuit also admitted that the result of the Hatch-Waxman Act
encouraging reverse payments was potentially disturbing, but the judicial preference for
116

Id. at 214.
Id. at 196.
118
Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 197.
119
See Quinn, supra note 30 (“The Tamoxifen court ruled that such a settlement agreement does not exceed the
scope of the patent where (1) there was no restriction on marketing non-infringing products; (2) a generic version of
the branded drug would necessarily infringe the branded firm’s patent; and (3) the agreement did not bar other
generic manufacturers from challenging the patent.”).
120
Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 206.
121
Id. at 208-09, 213.
122
Id. at 213 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
123
Id.
124
Id. at 214.
117
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settlement counterbalanced such troubling outcomes.125
The Second Circuit distinguished Cardizem by pointing out that in addition to a large
reverse payment, the settlement in that case involved a condition that the generic producer would
not market other non-infringing products which were not at issue in the case.126 In contrast, the
Tamoxifen settlement only concerned the drug covered by the brand name company’s patent, and
did not “restrain[] the introduction or marketing of unrelated or non-infringing products.”127
In subsequent reverse settlement litigation the Second Circuit panel of judges noted that
the Tamoxifen decision lead to a substantial increase in the number of reverse settlements,
declared that Tamoxifen was wrongly decided, and the panel encouraged the petitioners to apply
for rehearing en banc.128 Rehearing en banc was subsequently denied, with one of the judges
dissenting.129
The Federal Circuit also applied the scope of the patent analysis in In re Ciprofloxacin
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, indicating that “[t]he essence of the inquiry is whether the
agreements restrict competition beyond the exclusionary zone of the patent.”130 The court
upheld an agreement concerning an antibiotic, grounding its reasoning on the patent system’s
presumption of the patents’ validity, which gives the patentee “the right to exclude others from
profiting by the patented invention.”131 Accordingly, the court “agree[d] with the Second and
Eleventh Circuits . . . that, in the absence of evidence of fraud before the PTO or sham litigation,
Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 211 (“We are not unaware of a troubling dynamic that is at work in these cases. The less
sound the patent or the less clear the infringement, and therefore the less justified the monopoly enjoyed by the
patent holder, the more a rule permitting settlement is likely to benefit the patent holder by allowing it to retain the
patent.”).
126
Id. at 213-14.
127
Id.
128
Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 98, 108-10 (2d Cir. 2010), cert, denied, 604 F.3d
98 (2011).
129
See Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 625 F.3d 779 (2d Cir. 2010).
130
In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S.Ct.
2828 (2009).
131
Id. at 1333, 1337.
125
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the court need not consider the validity of the patent in the antitrust analysis of a settlement
agreement involving a reverse payment.”132 The court came to a conclusion that “all
anticompetitive effects of the settlement agreement are within the exclusionary power of the
patent.”133 The scope of patent test in Ciprofloxacin and other cases described above focused on
the exclusionary power of the patent, but some courts have deviated from this approach and
instead leaned toward the antitrust analysis which could more effectively further Congressional
goals of increasing competition between the pharmaceutical companies.134
C. The “Quick Look” Rule of Reason Approach – the In Re K-Dur Matter
Some courts rejected the scope of patent analysis and instead applied the framework
considering the anticompetitive market effects of the settlement to determine whether the
settlement posed an unreasonable restraint on commerce.135 To determine whether a restraint on
trade is unreasonable and therefore a violation of antitrust law, the courts generally apply the
“rule of reason”:136 “the finder of fact must decide whether the questioned practice imposes an
unreasonable restraint on competition, taking into account a variety of factors, including specific
information about the relevant business, its condition before and after the restraint was imposed,
and the restraint’s history, nature, and effect.”137 This “rule of reason” inquiry consists of three
steps: first, the movant must prove that the challenged conduct led to anti-competitive results
within the market.138 If the movant can meet this burden, “the burden shifts to the defendant to
show that the challenged conduct promotes a sufficiently pro-competitive objective.”139 The

132

Id. at 1336.
Id.
134
See H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, pt. 2, at 14-15 (1984).
135
United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 668 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing Cont’l T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433
U.S. 36, 49 (1977)).
136
State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997).
137
Id.
138
Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 668.
139
Id. at 669.
133
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movant can then rebut the defendant’s pro-competitive argument by proving that the restraint
created by the defendant is not reasonably necessary to accomplish the pro-competitive end.140
The Third Circuit applied the rule of reason framework to a reverse payment settlement
in In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation (“K-Dur”).141 K-Dur held that reverse settlements should be
presumed to constitute unreasonable restraints on trade, unless the parties can show otherwise.142
Some scholars have characterized the decision as “a home run in favor of antitrust scrutiny.”143
According to one source, “[a]n appellate court had not offered such a skeptical treatment of [the
reverse settlement] agreements since 2003, when the Sixth Circuit found one to be per se
illegal.”144
K-Dur concerned the same settlements which gave rise to Schering.145 The FTC filed a
suit against the pharmaceutical companies Schering, Upsher, and ESI, claiming that the two
settlements reached between these companies unreasonably restrained trade, violating Section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45.146 The FTC argued that the reverse
payments from Schering to the two generic brand companies, Upsher and ESI, effectively caused

140

Id.; In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 209 (3d Cir. 2012), petition for cert. filed, 81 U.S.L.W. 3090
(Aug. 24, 2012) (No. 12-245), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docket files/12245.htm; petition for cert. filed, (Aug. 29, 2012) (No. 12-265), available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/12-265.htm (citing 21 U.S.C. §
355(j)(5)(D)(iii))).
141
K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 197. On August 24, 2012, and August 29, 2012, two petitions for writ of certiorari by
defendants Merck & Co. and Upsher, respectively, were filed appealing the Third Circuit's decision in K-Dur.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Merck & Co. v. La. Wholesale Drug Co. (No. 12-245) (Aug. 24, 2012), available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docket files/12-245.htm; Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
Upsher-Smith Labs., Inc. v. La. Wholesale Drug Co. (No. 12-265) (Aug. 29, 2012), available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx? FileName=/docketfiles/12-265.htm.
142
Foster, supra note 26 at S-4.
143
Quinn, supra note 16.
144
In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 939 (2004); see
Michael Carrier, Reverse Payment Home Run for Pharma Antitrust Enforcement, IPWATCHDOG (Jul. 16, 2010, 3:50
PM), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2012/07/16/reverse-payment-home-run-for-pharma-antitrustenforcement/id=26491.
145
K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 211 (citing Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 548
U.S. 919 (2006) (“Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, arose out of the same settlement agreement as the instant
appeal.”).
146
Id. at 206-7.
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a delay in the market entry of the generic drugs, thereby improperly preserving Schering’s
monopoly.147 The ALJ dismissed the FTC’s complaint, holding that the agreements did not
violate Section 5 of the FTC Act.148 Applying the rule of reason, the FTC unanimously reversed
the ALJ’s decision, explaining that there was a “direct nexus between Schering’s payment and
Upsher’s agreement to delay its competitive entry” and that this agreement “unreasonably
restrain[ed] commerce.”149 According to the FTC’s decision, the entry of the parties into a
reverse settlement raises a red flag and can result in a prima facie evidence that an agreement
violates anti-competition laws.150 The FTC posited that the reverse payment at issue was
unlawful because the defendants could not show either that the settlement payment was for
something other than generic drug’s delayed entry, or that the payment had pro-competitive
effects.151 Consequently, Schering appealed the ruling of the FTC to the Eleventh Circuit, which
reversed the ALJ’s decision.152 Other private parties filed lawsuits alleging that the agreements
violated antitrust laws, which were consolidated in the District of New Jersey.153 The district
court adopted the scope of the patent test.154
On appeal, the Third Circuit disagreed with the district court’s reasoning, and instead
adopted a “quick look” rule of reason analysis.155 The court explained that in some instances
courts use “an antitrust analysis that falls between the full rule of reason inquiry on the one hand
and the rigid per se approach on the other,” also known as “quick look” or “truncated rule of

147

Id. at 207.
Id. (citing In re Schering-Plough Corp., Initial Decision, 136 F.T.C. 956, 1092, 1263 (2002)).
149
Id. (citing In re Schering-Plough Corp., Final Order, 136 F.T.C. 956, 991, 1000-01, 1052 (2003)).
150
K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 207 (citing Schering, 136 F.T.C. at 991, 1000-01).
151
Id.(citing Schering, 136 F.T.C. at 956, 988-89, 1061).
152
Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1066 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 919 (2006).
153
K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 207.
154
Id. at 208.
155
Foster, supra note 26 at S-5.
148

Page 20 of 38

Anelia Dikovytska

Comment – Final Draft

reason” analysis.156 The quick look rule of reason test applies where the plaintiff can
demonstrate that “the defendant has engaged in practices similar to those subject to per se
treatment.”157 The fact finder treats any agreement between a generic patent challenger and the
patentee where the patent challenger delays market entry of its generic drug in exchange for the
payment as prima facie evidence of an unreasonable restraint on commerce.158 If the plaintiff
can meet this burden, he or she is no longer required to demonstrate the anti-competitive results
of these practices on the market; instead, the burden shifts to the defendant, who can rebut the
presumption of illegality by showing that the reverse agreement has pro-competitive benefits or
that the payment was for a purpose other than delaying market entry.159
The clear split between the circuits, made sharper by the K-Dur decision, finally set the
stage for the Supreme Court’s resolution of the reverse payment settlement issue. In December
of 2012, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Watson.160 The defendants in K-Dur also
sought Supreme Court review, but the Court is holding that petition pending its ruling in
Watson.161 The Court is likely to hear oral argument in Watson during the last two weeks of
March 2013.162
V. PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS TO PAY FOR DELAY PROBLEM
In deciding Watson, the Supreme Court should take into consideration the legislative
history and proposed legislative solutions to reverse settlements. Even the main drafters of the
Hatch-Waxman Act, Senator Orrin Hatch and Congressman Waxman, expressed disapproval of
156

K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 209 (citing United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 669 (3d Cir. 1993)).
Id.
158
Id. at 218.
159
Id.
160
FTC v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 81 U.S.L.W. 3324 (U.S. Dec. 7,
2012) (No. 12-416).
161
U.S. Supreme Court to Rule on “Pay-for-Delay” Antitrust Issue, MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY (Dec. 10, 2012),
http://www.mwe.com/US-Supreme-Court-to-Rule-on-Pay-for-Delay-Antitrust-Issue-12-10-2012.
162
Id.; Lisa H. Wang, Proposed Bill Seeks to Answer the Pay for Delay Debate, IP LAW ALERT (Feb. 7, 2013),
http://www.iplawalert.com/tags/payfordelay.
157
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reverse settlements.163 Many scholars as well as the FTC and the DOJ have put forth an array of
solutions to the pay for delay controversy.164 For example, Christopher M. Holman proposed
eliminating the 180-day exclusivity period for first Paragraph IV applicants from the HatchWaxman Act to avoid many of the reverse payment settlement issues.165 Another option would
be to allow subsequent generic ANDA filers who submit a paragraph IV certification to be
eligible for the 180-day exclusivity window.166 Yet these solutions might prove ineffective
because lessening the advantages for generic drug manufacturers to challenge patented drugs
could disincentivize them from challenging name brand patents,167 despite the fact that generic
drug manufacturers would still retain other incentives to challenge patents without incurring
considerable risk.168
Though Congress is well aware of the Hatch-Waxman issue concerning pay for delay
deals, so far its attempts to address the problem have failed.169 The past few Congresses included
several propositions of the bills to outlaw or limit the use of the reverse payment settlements in
the context of Hatch-Waxman patent infringement lawsuits.170 Some of the earlier Senate bills,
such as S. 316 in the 110th Congress (2007-2008), promoted a per se illegality approach, seeking
to amend the Clayton Act to adopt the presumption of illegality as to reverse settlement.171 This
drastic measure was deemed politically unacceptable, and subsequent bills proposed instead to

163

Quinn, supra note 30.
Opderbeck, supra note 1717 at 1320.
165
Christopher M. Holman, Do Reverse Payment Settlements Violate the Antitrust Laws?, 23 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 489, 494-500 (2007).
166
Quinn, supra note 30.
167
Quinn, supra note 52 (“The generic drug companies have every incentive in the world under Hatch-Waxman to
challenge the patents held by pharmaceutical companies, but they reap a tremendous reward when they challenge the
patents and then ultimately back off due to a settlement of the dispute.”).
168
Opderbeck, supra note 17 at 1326 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4) (2006)).
169
Quinn, supra note 16.
170
Opderbeck, supra note 17 at 1318 (citing Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 369, 111th Cong. § 2(b)
(as reported and amended by S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Oct. 15, 2009); Protecting Consumer Access to Generic
Drugs Act of 2009, H.R. 1706, 11th Cong. § 2(a) (2009)).
171
Gregory, supra note 19 at 3.
164
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apply the established antitrust rule of reason framework to evaluate the legality of reverse
payments.172 S. 369, entitled the Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act,173 introduced in
111th Congress, initially advised for the per se approach, but its later modification called for the
rule of reason approach, treating reverse payments as presumptively anti-competitive and
allowing for the presumption to be overcome with a showing that the pro-competitive results of
the deal outweighed the anti-competitive outcomes.174 In addition, the bill contained a list of
factors that the court could incorporate into its rule of reason framework.175 The bill would also
allow a safe harbor for agreements in which the ANDA applicant is permitted to enter the market
earlier and is reimbursed for “reasonable litigation expenses not to exceed $ 7,500,000.”176
The present successor of S. 369, S. 27 in the current 112th Congress adopts the rule of
reason approach as well.177 Like its first two predecessors, S. 27 was favorably reported in 2011,
but the likelihood of this bill coming to a vote in the full Congress is low.178 Based on the
Senate’s inability to enact any of these measures, the Senate opponents of reverse payments have

172

Id.
Wang, supra note 162.
174
Opderbeck, supra note 17 at 1319 (citing S. 369 § 3(a). The revised version of the bill explained that reverse
settlements “have unduly delayed the marketing of low-cost generic drugs contrary to free competition, the interests
of consumers, and the principles underlying antitrust law.” S. 369 § 2(a)(6)(B). If passed, S. 369 would amend the
Clayton Act by adding a Section 29. See S. 369, 111th Cong. (2009)).
175
Id. (quoting S. 369 § 3(a)).The factors are:
(1) the length of time remaining until the end of the life of the relevant patent, compared with the agreed
upon entry date for the ANDA product;
(2) the value to consumers of the competition from the ANDA product allowed under the agreement;
(3) the form and amount of consideration received by the ANDA filer in the agreement resolving or settling
the patent infringement claim;
(4) the revenue the ANDA filer would have received by winning the patent litigation;
(5) the reduction in the NDA holder's revenues if it had lost the patent litigation;
(6) the time period between the date of the agreement conveying value to the ANDA filer and the date of
the settlement of the patent infringement claim; and
(7) any other factor that the fact finder, in its discretion, deems relevant to its determination of competitive
effects under this subsection.
176
Id.
177
Gregory, supra note 19 at 3.
178
Id. S. 316 and S. 369 were also favorably reported, but neither of the two came to a vote in the full senate. Id.
173
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put forward proposals endorsing more limited solutions.179 Specifically, on May 24, 2012,
Senator Bingamon proposed an amendment to S. 3187, the FDA Safety and Innovations Act,
which would disqualify the generic drug manufacturers who were the first to apply for an
approval of their generic version of the drug, but subsequently agreed to delay market entry,
from their eligibility for the 180-day exclusivity period.180 This amendment, however, failed by
a vote of 28-67.181
The reason behind Congress’ inability thus far to address the problem of reverse payment
settlements may be the fact that these agreements are a natural result of the Hatch-Waxman
framework.182 The legislation itself authorizes any “gaming” pertaining to the Hatch-Waxman
framework.183 The Hatch-Waxman Act creates a scheme of risk distribution where generic
manufacturers have all the incentives to file a paragraph IV certification. 184 The potential
benefits a brand name company may receive from entering its drug on the market or from
receiving a reverse payment from the patentee as a settlement of the patent infringement suit
outweigh any losses the generic manufacturers may incur.185 Conversely, the brand name
company may lose its monopoly over the drug and end up liable for costs and attorneys fees – a
high stake.186 In summary, thus far the proposed solutions to pay-for-delay problem have not
been successful.
VI. ALTERNATE APPROACHES TO REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS
179

Id.
Id.
181
Id.
182
See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation, 466 F.3d 187, 206-07 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 551 U.S.
1144 (2007).
183
Practising Law Institute, FTC Fed up with Hatch-Waxman Gaming, Goes on Offense, PATENT LAW PRACTICE
CENTER (Oct. 11, 2012, 6:17PM), http://patentlawcenter.pli.edu/2012/10/11/ftc-fed-up-with-hatch-waxman-gaminggoes-on-offense.
184
Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 207 (quoting Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1074 (11th Cir. 2005), cert.
denied, 548 U.S. 919 (2006)).
185
Id.
186
Id.; see also Opderbeck, supra note 17 at 1325-26 (citing Schering, 402 F.3d at 1070).
180
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In addition to the conflicting judicial frameworks adopted by the circuits who considered
the reverse settlement issue and the failed attempts by Congress to address the problem, the
relevant administrative agencies as well as a number of scholars have proposed ways to address
the harmful outcomes of reverse payment settlements.
A. Presumption of Illegality Versus Determining the Strength of the Patent on the Merits
The proposed legal and legislative frameworks to deal with reverse payment settlements
are either based on the antitrust law or center around patent law. The FTC recommended that the
federal legislation simply disallows all settlements in situations where the generic drug company
receives compensation in exchange for not placing its generic product on the market.187 The
Third Circuit agreed with the FTC that the courts should not consider the merits of the
underlying patent challenge lawsuit, thereby adopting the test based on antitrust law.188 Under
this test, unless countervailing proof is available, “it is logical to conclude that the quid pro quo
for the payment was an agreement by the generic to defer entry beyond the date that represents
an otherwise reasonable litigation compromise.”189 The DOJ similarly posited that it is “neither
necessary nor appropriate” for the court to determine the likelihood of success of the patent
challenge claim because such information would have been available to the parties at the time
they reached the settlement agreement.”190 Yet, the DOJ indicated that “[l]iability properly turns
on whether, in avoiding the prospect of invalidation that accompanies infringement litigation, the

187

Opderbeck, supra note 17 at 1317 (citing Anticompetitive Pay-for-Delay Settlements in the Pharmaceutical
Industry: Why Consumers and the Federal Government Are Paying Too Much for Prescription Drugs: Hearing on
H.R. 1706 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Competition Policy of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 1
(2009) (prepared statement of Richard A. Feinstein, Director, Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade Commission),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/06/P859910payfordelay.pdf)).
188
In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 219 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing In re Schering Plough Corp., Final Order,
136 F.T.C. 956, 988 (2003) (internal citations and brackets omitted)).
189
Id.
190
Opderbeck, supra note 17 at 1318 (citation omitted).
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parties have by contract obtained more exclusion than warranted in light of that prospect.”191
The DOJ further explained that if the payment to the potential patent infringer does not exceed
the costs of litigation, the payor would rebut the presumption of illegality.192 According to the
DOJ, the settlement agreements that prevent generic entry before the patent expires would not
meet this burden.193
Scott Hemphill agreed that “a settlement should be accorded a presumption of illegality
as an unreasonable restraint of trade if the settlement both restricts the generic firm's ability to
market a competing drug and includes compensation from the innovator to the generic firm.”194
Hemphill acknowledged that such strict antitrust approach could create over-deterrence and
invalidate potentially beneficial settlements. 195 Nevertheless, Hemphill indicated that underdeterrence would be more detrimental because allowing reverse settlements will continue
decreasing public’s access to the pharmaceutical products.196 Likewise, Michael Carrier favored
the antitrust framework and considering reverse settlements presumptively unlawful.197
Conversely, Daniel Crane advocated that reverse settlements should be resolved under
the intellectual property law and that the courts should assess the probability of success of the
patent challenge lawsuit on the merits.198 The courts should make ex ante determination of the
likelihood that the patent challenger’s lawsuit is successful.199 Based on this determination, the
courts would invalidate the settlements in which the probability of the challenger’s success was
191
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Implications, 54 FLA. L. REV. 747, 750 (2002).
199
Id.
192

Page 26 of 38

Anelia Dikovytska

Comment – Final Draft

high.200 According to Crane, restrictive tests to determine the validity of reverse settlements
would be detrimental and create uncertainty.201 David W. Opderbeck agreed that any framework
which would hold all reverse payments presumptively unlawful would pose a threat of overdeterrence and invalidate potentially beneficial and legitimate reverse settlements.202 Opderbeck
also notes, however, that “[p]atent rights are probabilistic, not certain, because validity and
infringement are always decided after the alleged infringement through litigation.”203 Hence, it
is impossible to make an ex ante determination of the patent scope with certainty.204
B. Using the Settlement Value to Determine the Strength of the Patent
The FTC and DOJ recommendations are in conformance with the Third Circuit’s
reasoning in In re K-Dur. Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark Janis, and Mark A. Lemley propose a
somewhat similar framework to adjudicate pay for delay agreements as that adopted in K-Dur.205
These scholars, like the K-Dur decision, posit that reverse payments should be presumed
unlawful, and the burden to prove the infringement should rest on the plaintiff.206 Under their
framework, however, intellectual property litigation concerning patent strength would still be
required in highly contested cases,207 and the rule of reason should apply only in certain cases
where the antitrust analysis is clear.208 The authors recognize that litigating the validity of the
patent is costly,209 thus, only in highly contested cases the plaintiff who filed the infringement
suit would be required to demonstrate that “(1) that the ex ante likelihood of prevailing in its
200
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infringement lawsuit is significant, and (2) that the size of the payment is no more than the
expected value of litigation and collateral costs attending the lawsuit.”210 Yet, the courts “need
not be particularly searching” in their inquiry concerning the patent infringement; they must only
focus on determining where “there is a legitimate dispute being settled.”211
Thomas Cotter opposes the proposal that the courts should analyze the patent challenge
disputes on their merits.212 Cotter notes that such approach would undermine the benefits the
parties seek to achieve by settling.213 Instead, Cotter argues that the potential value of the
litigation costs should be compared to the amount of the settlement to determine the validity of
the agreement.214 Opderbeck opines that both approaches mentioned above are problematic
because they “threaten to over-deter potentially beneficial settlements.”215 Such over-deterrence
would result from both the proposals comparing the settlements amounts with the litigation costs
to determine the settlement’s lawfulness and the proposals using the settlement amount to
determine the strength of the patent at issue.216 Such approaches could result in “false positives”
as they fail to recognize that reverse settlements may in fact be beneficial to the consumers in
certain cases.217 Opderbeck explains that if the settlement amounts are used as the only measure
to determine the validity of the patent, the patent will either be upheld and prevent any generic
competition during the remainder of the patent term, or the patent will be struck down.218 Yet,
the terms of most reverse settlements allow market entry of the generic drug at some point before
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the patent expiration date.219 A reverse payment agreement that leads to a reduced patent term is
often more beneficial to the public than the patent challenge litigation and subsequent appeals.220
The settlement amounts should not be used to determine the strength of the patent
because many reverse settlements include license agreements and other side deals.221 In
addition, the generic Paragraph IV applicant does not risk much by filing the infringement suit,
while the patent owner risks losing a significant revenue-producing asset.222 The patent owner
must also factor in the possibility of additional Paragraph IV applicants challenging its patent
when determining the amount of the settlement.223 Therefore, settlement value should not be
used as an indicator of the strength of the patent.
C. Creating a Scale of Anticompetitive Effects to Evaluate the Reverse Settlement
Each of the approaches discussed above is problematic in one way or another and
revolves around the exclusionary power of the patent.224 Opderbeck proposed evaluating reverse
settlements based on an inquiry into the actual anti-competitive effects of these agreements,225
which would be more efficient and allow more certainty in the settlement bargaining process.226
A Settlement Competition Index (“SCI”) would “provide[ ] a rough empirical gauge of the
potential anticompetitive effects of the settlement.”227 The SCI would be based on two criteria:
“(1) The difference in product market concentration that would likely result from the agreement
and (2) [t]he probability that the patent will be held to be valid and infringed.”228 In other words,
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the first part assesses the power of the patent, and the second part assesses its scope.229 The
lower range of the SCI would be a “safety zone,” and the settlements falling under it would be
presumed lawful based on the legitimate exclusionary power of the patent.230 Settlements falling
at the higher range of the SCI would be declared per se illegal.231 Settlements falling in the
middle would undergo a balancing test under the rule of reason.232 When the settlement at issue
requires such heightened evaluation, the court or regulatory agency would consider a number of
factors under the rule of reason to establish whether the agreement was reasonable.233 Opderbeck
notes that because the agreements falling at the middle range of SCI would involve a degree of
uncertainty and expense to evaluate, the companies will be less likely to enter into such
settlements.234
Indeed, the SCI would streamline the court’s task of evaluating the legality of reverse
payment settlements and circumvent the problem of over- and under-deterrence. The ex ante
determination of the patent validity, however, would still be required for the settlements falling
in the middle range of the spectrum. Opderbeck proposes that to avoid a “’trial within a trial’ on
patent strength,” courts could engage experts or institute procedures to reasonably estimate
patent strength without holding a complete infringement trial.235 Because a complete, final
determination of patent’s validity would not be necessary, and a reasonable assessment would be
satisfactory for this proposal, utilization of an index such as SCI would be the most effective
framework for the judiciary to answer the question of reverse settlement lawfulness.
229
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VII. THE MOST EFFICIENT JUDICIAL SOLUTION TO THE PAY FOR DELAY PROBLEM
The scope of the patent test adopted by the Eleventh, Second, and Federal Circuits does
not provide adequate solution to the pay for delay issue. The Third Circuit in K-Dur explained
that where the court applies the scope of the patent test, a reverse payment case usually does not
go to trial, thus the test fails to subject reverse settlements to any antitrust scrutiny.236 The courts
who adopted the scope of the patent test to adjudicate the validity of pay for delay settlements
have failed to recognize “that the ‘scope of the patent’ test applied by the courts assumes the
very validity that is at issue in these cases.”237 Therefore, the courts must look at whether the
patent is actually valid and take into account the fact that patents merely represent “a legal
conclusion reached by the Patent Office.”238 In many cases patents turn out to be invalid or not
infringed, and according to a study conducted by the FTC, “in Hatch-Waxman challenges made
under Paragraph IV, the generic challenger prevailed seventy-three percent of the time.”239 This
explains the incentive that the holder of a weak patent has to settle the patent challenge lawsuit,
thereby buying its way out of the competition with the generic company as well as possible
patent invalidation.240
Therefore, the scope of the patent test would allow the patent holder of even the weakest
patent to prevail, resulting in under-deterrence of the illicit reverse settlement and causing
serious detriment to consumers by delaying entry of generic drugs on the market. Applying the
per se approach to all reverse settlements would cause over-deterrence and invalidate some
236
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reverse settlements which would potentially benefit the public. Therefore, most of the solutions
to the pay for delay problem adopted by the circuit courts or proposed by the distinguished
scholars would cause over- or under-deterrence of the reverse settlements. The best judicial
solution to this challenging issue is the creation of a scale based on the anticompetitive effects of
reverse settlements such as the one proposed by David W. Opderbeck.241 Adopting this
approach would prevent over- and under-deterrence by allowing the courts or regulatory
agencies to uphold the settlements potentially beneficial to the consumers while declaring those
with highly anti-competitive effects per se unlawful.
Public interest favors exploitation of ideas, and because weak patents may undermine this
goal, it is in the best interest of the public that the weak patents are eliminated through the court
system.242 Congress enacted the Hatch-Waxman Act with a goal of attaining balance between
the interests of the patentees and the necessary incentives to the patent challengers to enable and
encourage competition in the pharmaceutical industry.243 As the Third Circuit elucidated, “[t]he
line that Congress drew between these competing objectives strongly supports the application of
rule of reason scrutiny of reverse payment settlements in the pharmaceutical industry.”244 This
approach is not inconsistent with the scale-based approach described above: the courts would
consider the anticompetitive effects of the settlements falling at the middle of the sliding scale
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more deeply based on their merits. Hence, some form of the sliding scale framework should be
adopted by the Supreme Court as the most effective judicial solution to the problem.
VIII. USE OF FINANCIAL REGULATION TO FIGHT THE PROBLEM OF DRUG ACCESSIBILITY,
INCLUDING THE HARMFUL RESULTS OF REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS
Even if the Supreme Court adopts a form of the sliding scale framework described above,
the reverse settlements will still remain a source of lengthy, costly, and complicated litigation, at
least for those settlements deserving higher scrutiny. Furthermore, the fundamental interest of
the consumers in the availability of accessibly-priced generic drugs will only be addressed
partially with the resolution of the current circuit split. The larger-scale problem of the
accessibility of drugs to the public will remain largely unresolved.
Despite the justifications to the current patent system delineated at the beginning of this
Comment, this system results in wastefulness, in part because the pharmaceutical companies
have to cover the costs of filing and litigating patents, often in many countries.245 Moreover, the
pharmaceutical companies are profit-oriented and place very low or no emphasis on promoting
the optimum use of their products or ensuring that the medicines are utilized by only those who
need them.246 Therefore, the current patent system results in excessive drug prices that should
instead be subject to competition, in line with the aims of the Hatch-Waxman Act. To alleviate
this dire problem, the government should take measures involving financial regulation by
implementing specific types of payment systems.
One institutional reform proposed by many scholars, known as the Health Impact Fund
(“HIF”), could alleviate the problems of the newly globalised patent monopoly by providing an
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additional source of incentives and rewards to promote development of new pharmaceuticals.247
The HIF would allow more effective use of available medicines, higher profits for drug
companies, and the worldwide improvement of the health delivery system.248 This novel way of
paying for pharmaceutical improvement would provide pharmaceutical companies with constant
financial incentives to develop drugs that have significant effects on global health and to provide
these drugs worldwide at the lowest possible cost of manufacture and distribution.249
The HIF would be formed as an international agency underwritten by governments.250
The pharmaceutical companies would have the option to register with the HIF their most
effective new products.251 Registering will enable these companies to receive a set amount of
remuneration for a defined time period, like 10 years.252 Each registrant would receive a share of
the fund proportional to the registrant’s contribution to the improvement of health due to their
registered product.253 The registrant would thus be encouraged to produce medications
addressing the most harmful global health threats.254 To receive its share of funds, the registrant
would also be required to sell the product “at no more than the lowest feasible cost of production
and distribution, and after the end of the reward period offer free licences [sic] to enable generic
manufacture and sales.”255 This would allow the populations otherwise unable to afford the
pharmaceuticals sold at a patent mark-up to gain access to these pharmaceuticals due to their low
sale prices.256 Moreover, the registrant companies would have incentives to ensure that their
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products, in addition to being widely available, are also adequately prescribed and optimally
used, because their reward would be based on the global health impact of their product.257
The most significant objection to the proposal of creating the HIF is the difficulty of
assessing global health impact of a particular medicine.258 In comparison with the present
situation, however, the advantages of the HIF are obvious because its basis for rewards would
use much more information than the current reward system takes into account.259 Furthermore,
the cost of obtaining the global effects data is outweighed by the cost-effectiveness produced by
HIF, saving money to all those who pay for medicines, including all patients, rich and poor, and
taxpayers. 260
William W. Fisher and Talha Syed agree with the idea of “increasing . . . the extent to
which pharmaceutical firms must conduct research on diseases common in developing countries
or by requiring the firms to make the fruits of that research available at low prices to the
residents of those countries.”261 In addition, to address the drug accessibility issue on a national,
as opposed to global, level, Fisher and Syed propose amending or modifying laws which govern
the production and distribution of pharmaceuticals.262 Specifically, the government should
increase control over the prices of pharmaceuticals, establish closer monitoring over what
investment choices the pharmaceutical companies make, and dedicate more public funds to drug
research and development.263
The states have an ability to set rates for pharmaceuticals: “Congress gave the states
significant flexibility in rate setting in order to encourage them to experiment with different
257
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payment and health delivery models that would reduce cost and deliver care more efficiently.”264
Through the Medicaid Act and other legislation, Congress clarified its position that rates must be
appropriate to accomplish other program goals, such as providing that the public has equal
access to health care that is timely and of good quality.265 In addition, the states must follow
certain procedural guidelines to comply with the law, including proposing rates for federal
approval and providing the public with adequate notice and chance to comment.266 While the
delivery and payment system addressed in the article pertains to rate setting for health care
services, the pharmaceuticals can be subjected to a similar approach. Medicare and Medicaid
could regulate their expenditures by covering only a percentage of the brand name drug cost that
equals or somewhat exceeds the expected cost of this drug’s generic version. Private insurance
companies could establish similar cost regulation frameworks.
Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services (“CMS”) delegated the responsibility to
oversee the state rate-setting process to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
(“HHS”).267 Until very recently, the HHS has not utilized its rulemaking power to offer
guidance to the states, health care providers, or the consumers about the rate-setting procedure
and factors the states should consider to evaluate the adequacy of such rates.268 Similarly, the
CMS has not exercised its enforcement authority to refuse state rate cuts that infringe federal
law.269
In accordance with the recommendations of the Institute of Medicine, Stephen M.
Shortell and Lawrence P. Casalino suggest creating a national system measuring performance by
264
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assessing the quality and cost of health care.270 This measurement system could be used by CMS
to develop a payment system based on value of the services rendered.271 The Agency for Health
Research and Quality (“AHRQ”) could take on the responsibility to monitor the payment
system.272 Additionally, Shortell and Casalino advocate that “Medicare make fundamental
changes in payment to reward providers based on the value (outcomes achieved / cost) of care
delivered.”273 The CMS should have the authority to allocate the rewards to health providers
based on the results they achieved.274 Once again, although the article focuses on health care
providers, similar approach can be implemented to regulate the quality and cost of
pharmaceutical products.
Although one could regard such government regulation as an unlawful interference with
the companies’ freedom,275 the state action already heavily influences the shape of all of its
markets, including the market in pharmaceuticals.276 Because of the persistent market failures
with respect to the pharmaceutical industry and its failure to maximize social welfare, the
governmental interference, participation, and monitoring in allocation of healthcare funds is not
only desirable but necessary.277
IX. CONCLUSION
The judiciary, the legislature, and the legal scholars agree that the objective of the Hatch-
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Waxman Act was to increase the availability of low cost generic drugs to the public.278 The
long-standing dispute regarding the reverse settlements should be resolved by the Supreme Court
by adopting the sliding scale approach based on the relative anticompetitive effect of the reverse
settlement. This would ensure that the legitimate settlements are upheld while anti-competitive
behavior based on invalid patents is eliminated. Nevertheless, the judicial solution to pay-fordelay deals is insufficient to meet the goals of the Hatch-Waxman Act. Establishing the HIF is a
fair, cost-efficient way of promoting research and development of important pharmaceuticals and
making these pharmaceuticals accessible worldwide. In the United States, to drastically increase
the accessibility of pharmaceuticals and thereby improve health, the federal government, the
states, and the private insurance companies should consider effectuating financial regulation
techniques, such as rate setting for the prices of specific drugs, to reduce the costs of health care
and provide long-term benefits to the consumers.
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